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Introduction
It is well accepted that emergency food transfers are
required to meet the food needs of affected populations
during acute, short-run emergencies.  It is also widely
acknowledged that growing incomes and well functioning
markets are necessary to facilitate access to food by
vulnerable groups over the long run.  What is less
appreciated is that market-based strategies can be used to
a) directly address short-run emergencies, and b) reduce
the severity of short and long-run emergencies.  The
purpose of this short paper is to call attention to research
findings that provide important guidelines for how this
can be done.
In addition to localized transitory emergencies requiring
quick responses to avert famine, it is important to
recognize a looming long run emergency in Sub-Saharan
Africa, one that will result in a food shortfall of 50 million
tons by the year 2000 if measures are not taken now to
reverse current trends (Pinstrup-Anderson 1994; see also
Yudelman, et al. 1994).  For this reason, we stress that
disaster relief programs to protect vulnerable groups'
access to food during transitory crises will be more
successful and less costly when combined with strategies
to alleviate the chronic causes of poverty.  This requires
a focus on achieving productivity gains in the entire food
system that increase incomes and reduce the real cost of
food to consumers over time.  The scale of vulnerability
to drought and other transitory crises in Africa is
primarily due to structural causes of poverty related to
low-productivity agricultural systems.  Since poverty is
the major underlying cause of food access problems,
measures to increase real incomes and reduce food costs
are crucial, and both of these are achieved mainly through
productivity growth throughout the food system.
Guidelines
On-going field research provides some guidelines
concerning how emergency assistance can be designed to
improve or at least not hinder the functioning of markets,
and how longer-run development assistance can be
designed to enable vulnerable households to cope more
effectively during transitory food shortfalls:
1.  Invest in local analytical capacity to understand
the behavior of the food system into which food aid
is injected.  Monetization is often seen as one way to
reconcile the potential conflict between the short-run
objectives of food aid and the long-run development
objectives of the country.  Selling the food rather than
distributing it free of charge is thought to support the
development of markets and avoid some of the
discincentive effects that may accompany free
distribution.  However, whether monetization in fact
relieves this conflict in any given country depends on
many details of the food aid program.  Experience in
Mozambique of selling food aid into a competitive
market system shows that food aid can destabilize the
market and can also generate very large rents to the large
traders who typically act as first-buyers.  In Zimbabwe,
the monetization and subsidization of maize through the
existing large-scale milling system suppressed the growth
of small hammer mills and small-scale trading networks
that were to be the cornerstone of the donor-supported
Grain Market Reform Program.  In each case, a better
understanding of the marketing system into which food
aid was being injected could have helped avoid many of
these problems.
2.  Create a food aid distribution system that ensures
active exchange of information across programs for
free distribution and programs for monetization.
Non-market distribution of food aid inevitably affects
markets.  Often, these effects stem only from the fact that
free distribution of food aid is never perfectly targeted.
As a result, the aid displaces some amount of grain
purchases that receiving households would otherwise
have made on the market, thus reducing demand and
driving prices down.  At other times, emergency grain
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leaks directly on to markets.  In either case, the
emergency program can have very significant effects on
markets.  Donors and private sector participants in the
monetization program need to have reliable information
on emergency distribution plans if they are to manage
their program in a way that strengthens rather than harms
markets.
3.  Work with government agencies, trade
associations, NGOs and other donors to invest in
public goods such as market information systems,
communication networks, a process for establishing legal
foundations of markets, and contract enforcement
capabilities.  Market information systems can be
especially helpful in monitoring the effects of food aid
programs on markets.
4.  Reduce food costs by expanding the range of
products available to produce and consume.
Accurate knowledge of consumer behavior (e.g.,
knowledge of potential demand for products currently not
in the market) is critical to guide market development
programs to improve household access to food,
particulary for low-income consumers.  Key findings
from on-going research in this area include:  
a.  Consumer preferences can be largely
policy-driven.  White maize meal consumption patterns
in much of eastern and southern Africa appear largely to
reflect the influence of food policies affecting the relative
convenience and affordability of refined maize meal in
relation to whole meal, rather than a strong taste
preference for refined meal.  For example, less than 20%
of 344 urban consumers surveyed in Nairobi in 1993
expressed a strong taste preference for the more
expensive refined maize meal, as opposed to the much
less expensive unrefined (posho) meal.  The most
important factors affecting consumer choice was relative
price and procurement convenience, both of which are
largely a function of prevailing and historical government
policy.  Policy regulations that increased time costs for
procuring whole meal and increased its price relative to
refined meal (due to subsidies on the latter) have
apparently biased urban white maize consumption
patterns towards the latter.
b.  Consumer subsidies on refined maize meal
in Kenya and Zimbabwe have not necessarily
promoted food security.  Rather, these policies (and
associated controls on maize marketing) have entrenched
a relatively high-cost marketing system and impeded the
development of lower-cost channels.  Regulations or
inefficiencies at certain stages of the controlled marketing
system impose costs that overwhelm the effects of direct
government subsidies.  Findings from both Kenya and
Zimbabwe indicate that the subsidy on sifted (refined)
flour during 1993 was approximately equal to the
difference in milling margins between the large-scale
milling firms producing the refined meals and informal
hammer mills producing whole meals (Mukumbu and
Jayne 1994; Rubey 1993; Chisvo 1993).  This suggests
that governments could have attained their objective of
low-cost food for urban consumers just as effectively
without any subsidy if they had taken the policy steps
needed to make whole meal more easily available in the
market.
c.  Subsidies on sifted flour in Kenya, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe were captured primarily by high
income consumers.  This conclusion follows from the
finding that consumption of whole meal appears to be
negatively related to household income, while refined
meal consumption positively related to income
(Mukumbu and Jayne 1994; Rubey 1993; Diskin 1994).
These findings also suggest that whole maize meal is to
some extent self-targeting, i.e., given its low price
relative to alternatives, it would be the product of choice
for many low-income households.  These findings are
consistent with recent findings elsewhere in Southern
Africa (Rubey 1993; Diskin 1994; Jayne et al. 1994).
d.  Evidence from Mozambique and Zambia
suggests that preferences for white over yellow maize
are less strong than previously thought.  In
Mozambique, where yellow and white maize grain and
meals have been freely available at market prices for
more than five years, white grain typically receives a 30%
to 35% premium over yellow.  Whole yellow meal is
typically 30% cheaper than refined yellow meal.  At these
price relationships, poor consumers strongly prefer
yellow, unrefined maize meal.  Sahn and Desai (1992)
estimate that the poorest 20% of consumers in the capital
city, Maputo, allocate 15% of total expenditures to yellow
maize grain and meal (primarily unrefined), and only 3%
to white maize.  In Zambia, when yellow maize was
imported in response to the 1992 drought and injected
onto local markets, its price was 10% to 35% lower than
white maize for comparably refined meals.  Thus, the
record in both countries suggests that poor consumers
can receive substantial benefits without any government
subsidies simply by allowing unrefined yellow meal to be
readily available in the market.  More generally, allowing
greater consumer choice in food can go a long way
towards replacing government subsidies in economies
that have been heavily regulated.Pag. 3
e.  Market reforms that allow the system to be
more responsive to consumer preferences may also
facilitate increased productivity and employment
growth.  For example:
i.  Yellow maize currently has higher
yields than white maize under the same production
technology in Southern Africa.  Allowing smallholders to
produce yellow maize would thus increase productivity
at the farm level;
ii.  At the sectoral level, allowing the
market to determine the demand for yellow maize could
also increase the policy options available to government
to ensure sufficient maize supplies at stable prices.  This
conclusion is based on the fact that the world market for
yellow maize is far larger and far more stable than that
for white maize.  Policy makers can therefore use it much
more effectively to stabilize domestic markets.  If
governments make the political decision that their
constituents will not have access to yellow maize in spite
of an apparent niche for it among low-income consumers
in some countries, then it is important to recognize that
this decision entails relatively higher stock levels and
stockholding costs, relatively higher white maize prices,
relatively higher import prices in the event of shortfalls,
and relatively higher levels of food insecurity.
iii.  Whole meals can be argued to
increase food system productivity, since they yield 15%
to 40% more human food, and at a lower price, for a
given amount of grain.  
iv.  Hammer mill technology (which is
used to produce whole meal) generates more employment
per unit of production, and because the equipment is
much less expensive, provides an entrepreneurial
opportunity for far more people than does large scale
roller mill technology.
f.  Perhaps most importantly for future
research, we stress the importance of ex ante analysis
that informs decision makers regarding how
preferences may change with policy, instead of
implicitly taking preferences as given and
formulating food policies around prevailing
consumption patterns.  When given a wider range of
products differentiated by price, consumer choices may
be more flexible than supposed by conventional wisdom.
Improved knowledge of consumer behavior can widen
policy makers' perceptions of feasible options to protect
vulnerable groups and increase receptivity to sustaining
the recent food policy reforms in Africa.  A corollary of
this is that this kind of knowledge may help policy
makers feel less compelled to reimpose controls at a later
stage in the reform process.
5.  Focus on the cost and reliability of food supplies
to rural areas as a part of income diversification
strategies designed to promote access to food over the
longer run.  It is difficult for rural households to exploit
alternative income earning opportunities such as cash
cropping or non-farm employment when food markets do
not assure a reliable supply of food in rural areas or when
retail food costs in rural areas are so high that these
activities become unviable.  Thus, underdeveloped rural
food markets trap smallholders in food security strategies
that result in incomes and food security levels lower than
they would otherwise be.
6.  Focus on achieving productivity gains in the entire
food system.  Government and donor disaster relief
programs to protect vulnerable groups' access to food
during transitory crises will be more successful and less
costly when combined with strategies to alleviate the
chronic causes of poverty.  This requires a focus on
achieving productivity gains in the entire food system that
increase incomes and reduce the real costs of food to
consumers over time.  The scale of vulnerability to
drought and other transitory crises in Africa is primarily
due to structural causes of poverty related to low-
productivity agricultural systems.  Since poverty is the
major underlying cause of food access problems,
measures to increase real incomes and reduce food costs
are crucial, and both of these are achieved mainly through
productivity growth.
7.  Researchers need to study the implications for
emergency programs of evolving United States and
international food and trade policies.  Changes in the
international policy environment brought on by GATT,
and in the domestic environment by pending changes in
U.S. commodity policy, may make it easier to design
market-based approaches to emergency assistance.  One
important effect of these policy changes is likely to be
further reductions in industrial country grain surpluses.
Assuming continued commitment by these countries to
humanitarian assistance, this new policy environment
introduces the possibility and perhaps necessity of
delinking such assistance from commodity policy.  In
other words, it may now be possible to see a time when
emergency assistance programs would be based on a pot
of money rather than a bushel of corn.  Relaxing the
requirement that emergency assistance monies be used to
purchase surplus commodities could bring significant
benefits in the form of reduced costs and increased
programmatic flexibility:Pag. 4
a.  Having money rather than commodities to
respond to emergencies can reduce international
transport costs and time procurement delays.  This is
possible because food emergencies seldom affect all
areas of a country or region.  Thus, it is generally possible
to procure needed supplies in surplus areas of the
affected country, or at least in regional markets.  This
should improve timeliness (a frequent problem in
emergency programs) and reduce costs.
b.  Donors and national governments could
more easily facilitate effective market responses to
emergency situations.  One can imagine an approach in
which donors and the local government mount cash for
work projects in areas of the country affected by drought
or some other natural or man-made disaster, thereby
increasing effective demand in the area.  At the same
time, they facilitate market response to this increased
demand through temporary transport subsidies into the
area.  This approach could be effective if the country has
areas of surplus production and if an adequate trading
network exists.  If domestic surplus areas do not exist,
special lines of credit to importers could also be used.
This is only one example of how markets could be
utilized more effectively to address emergency situations
in the new policy environment.
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Notes
This paper was originally presented at a workshop in
Washington D.C. on June 28-29, 1994.  The title of the
workshop was “The Silent Challenge of Hunger”, sponsored by
the U.S. Agency for International Development, Global Bureau,
Office of Agriculture and Food Security, in Washington D.C.